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INTRODUCTION 
It is not surprising that the United States Supreme Court decision 
in United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain1 has caused consider-
able concern and shock among the international bar, not only in 
this country but abroad. This article attempts to make a detailed 
analysis of the decision itself, of Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning 
and his interpretation of various decisions cited and relied on in the 
opinion, and their application to the case. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Souter, Thomas, and White joined. Justice Stevens filed a strong 
dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor. 
Part I of this article provides the facts of the Alvarez-Machain case. 
Part II gives an in-depth analysis of the decision and relevant case 
history. This part concludes that Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision 
was poorly reasoned, contrary to controlling precedent, and should 
t Copyright © 1993, Manuel R. Angulo, James D. Reardon, Jr. 
* Partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosie, New York City; Former Lecturer of Law at 
both the Villanova School of Law and the University of Virginia School of Law. 
** Associate, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosie. 
I 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). There are three articles published on this subject of general interest 
in the October, 1992 issue of the AmericanJournal of International Law: Malvina Halberstam, 
In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM.]. INT'L L. 736 (1992); 
Michael]. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 86 AM.]. INT'L L. 746 (1992); Monroe Leigh, Is the President Above Customary 
International Law?, 86 AM.]. INT'L L. 757 (1992); see also Note, The Supreme Court Decision 
in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 32 VA.]. INT'L L. 979 (1992). 
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not stand. Part III contains various recommendations as to what the 
Mexican government might consider to rectify the legal precedent 
established by the Supreme Court. In addition, Part III considers 
proposals of legislation or executive action to prohibit abductions 
of the kind with which the decision deals. This article also proposes 
the use of a petition for rehearing and an advisory opinion from the 
International Court of Justice. These measures are necessary, it is 
believed, because legislative or executive action does not effectively 
eradicate a decision's establishment oflegal precedent and the force 
of its inaccuracies and legal error. The article concludes with a 
Section entitled Post Script, which describes the various actions taken 
before the federal courts of the United States and the steps taken 
in international forums designed to correct the Rehnquist decision. 
I. FACTS OF THE CASE 
A citizen and resident of Mexico, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, was 
forcibly kidnapped from his home in Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico 
and flown by private plane against his will to Texas, where he was 
arrested by U.S. authorities for his alleged participation in the kid-
napping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
agent and the agent's pilot.2 The District Court found that DEA 
agents were responsible for the abduction even though they had 
enlisted some Mexican nationals to assist them. 3 
Alvarez-Machain moved in the District Court to dismiss his indict-
ment on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
him since his abduction by the DEA was protested by the Mexican 
government4 and thus was in violation of the Extradition Treaty 
between the United States and Mexico.5 The District Court dis-
missed the indictment and ordered the government to repatriate 
the defendant to Mexico on the ground that the United States had 
violated the Extradition Treaty by unilaterally abducting the defen-
dant from Mexico.6 
The United States appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth 
2 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990); afi'd, 996 F.2d 
1966 (9th Cir. 1991). 
31d. at 609. "[I] t is clear that state responsibility attaches to acts committed by agents of a 
state or by private individuals acting for or on behalf of the state." ld. (quoting 1 M. CHERIF 
BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAw AND PRACTICE 216 (2d rev. 
ed.1987). 
4 See Caro-Qyintero, 745 F. Supp. at 604, 608. 
5 Extradition Treaty, May 4,1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty 
or Treaty]. 
6 Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 614-15. 
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Circuit, which affirmed the District Court judgment holding that the 
forcible abduction of Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, by 
agents of the DEA violated the Extradition Treaty.7 Simultaneously, 
the Ninth Circuit heard United States v. Verdugo-Urquideil which 
presented identical issues. The court remanded the case for a hear-
ing on whether Verdugo's abduction had been authorized by the 
DEA; and if so, ordered the District Court to release Verdugo and 
return him to Mexico because a violation of the Extradition Treaty 
had occurred, even though the treaty did not expressly prohibit such 
abduction.9 The Supreme Court considered the case on the narrow 
issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applied to an alien located 
in a foreign country and held that it did not. lO 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court order releasing Al-
varez-Machain and ordered his repatriation to Mexico.ll The Ninth 
Circuit relied heavily on its decision in Verdugo in affirming the 
District Court order in Alvarez-Machain. 12 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari of the Alvarez-Machain case and reversed and re-
manded. 13 The Court held that the conduct of the agents of the 
United States government was not explicitly or impliedly forbidden 
by the Extradition Treaty. The abduction did not deprive the Court 
of jurisdiction to try the defendant on U.S. criminal charges, not-
withstanding the fact that the government of Mexico protested the 
abduction on several occasions on the grounds of the Extradition 
Treaty violation. 14 Thus, the Supreme Court held that Alvarez-
Machain's forcible abduction did not prohibit his trial in the U.S. 
courts for a violation of this country's laws. IS 
II. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION 
A. The "Ker-Frisme Doctrine" and Due Process 
Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to have relied heavily upon the 
Court's decision in Ker v. Illinois,16 and the so-called rule that the 
power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the 
7 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991). 
8939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991). 
9 Id. at 1362. 
10 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274-75 (1990). 
II Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at 1467. 
12Id. 
13 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197. 
14Id. 
15Id. 
16119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
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fact that the person has been brought within the Court's jurisdiction 
by reason of a "forcible abduction."17 The Court quotes Frisbie v. 
Collins18 on the interpretation of the so-called "Ker-Frisbie doctrine," 
which is in effect the maxim mala captus bene detentus under which 
a national court will assert in personam jurisdiction without inquiring 
into the means by which the presence of the defendant was se-
cured.19 
The facts of Ker are as follows. The defendant Ker was charged 
with larceny in Illinois.20 While in the city of Lima, Peru, he was 
kidnapped and brought to this country against his will.21 The Presi-
dent of the United States, at the request of the governor of Illinois, 
had previously issued a warrant requesting the extradition of Ker by 
the authorities of the Republic of Peru in compliance with the treaty 
of extradition between the United States and Peru.22 One Julian, a 
private investigator, was given the warrant to deliver to the Peruvian 
authorities.23 Upon arrival in Lima, Julian presented no papers to 
the Peruvian authorities, but for reasons not reported he decided 
to apprehend the defendant himself.24 Ker was forcibly placed 
aboard a U.S. vessel bound for the United States.25 At no time did 
the Peruvian authorities object to this procedure. Ker asserted that 
the state court had no jurisdiction because his forcible abduction 
violated due process and that his abduction violated the extradition 
treaties between the United States and Peru which conferred on him 
a right of asylum in Peru.26 
The Ker case is clearly no authority for Alvarez-Machain. In the 
first place, while there was a treaty between the United States and 
Peru, the abduction of Ker was not made pursuant to the treaty of 
extradition but rather by an independent person who was not acting 
under the authority of the United States nor in fact any authority.27 
Because he was not acting as an agent of the state, his actions were 
not an act of state. The treaty was not invoked. Ker entered a plea 
17Id. at 444. 
18 342 U.S. 519, reh'g denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952). 
19 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2192-93. 
20 Ker; 119 U.S. at 437. 
21 Id. at 438. 
22Id. 
23Id. 
24Id. 
25Id. 
26Id. at 439-41. 
27Id. at 442-43. 
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that the alleged method by which he was brought before the Illinois 
court denied him due process of law. 28 The Court points out that 
the defendant was indicted, tried and convicted in the state of 
Illinois for larceny.29 There was no complaint that during this process 
he had not been guaranteed compliance with all the due processes 
of law for such trials.30 The court in Ker did not establish or follow 
any rule of mala captus bene detentus. 31 On the contrary, the court 
clearly stated: 
We do not intend to say that there may not be proceedings 
previous to trial in regard to which the person could invoke 
in some manner the provisions of this clause of the Con-
stitution, but, for mere irregularities in the manner in which 
he may be brought into the custody of the law, we do not 
think that he is entitled to say that he should not be tried 
at all for the crime with which he is charged in a regular 
indictment.32 
Apparently the Court considered a forceful kidnapping from one 
country to another as a "mere irregularity."33 This holding had 
nothing to do with the violation of an extradition treaty. 
In fact, that Treaty was not called into operation, was not 
relied upon, was not made a pretext of arrest and the facts 
show that it was a clear case of kidnapping within the 
dominions of Peru without any pretense of authority under 
the Treaty or from the government of the United States.34 
In other words, as pointed out by the District Court, Ker established 
a constitutional doctrine which limits the application of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to trial procedures notwithstanding pre-
trial problems of an illegal arrest and kidnapping.35 The Ker court 
did not foreclose the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment 
might be available to pre-trial procedures as well. In any event, the 
28Id. at 439-40. 
29Id. at 437. 
30Id. at 440-4l. 
31 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (1992). 
32 KeF; 119 U.S. at 440 (emphasis added). 
33 See id. 
34Id. at 443. 
35 See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599. 604-06 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
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District Court stated that the Ker doctrine had no application to 
violations of federal treaty law. 36 
Although Frisbie v. Collins did not involve an extradition treaty, 
the case raised due process concerns. The defendant was forcibly 
removed from Illinois to Michigan where he was tried, convicted, 
and imprisonedY The defendant sought relief by a petition of 
habeas corpus for release from a Michigan prison on the ground 
that he was kidnapped from Illinois to be tried in Michigan. The 
defendant claimed, therefore, that he was being deprived of the due 
process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal 
Kidnapping Act.38 The Court held that the forcible abduction of a 
defendant from one state to be tried in another does not invalidate 
a trial conviction by the court of the abducting state as a violation 
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.39 
The scope of due process protection has been greatly expanded 
since Ker and Frisbie. For example, in United States v. Toscanino,40 the 
Second Circuit held that a court was now required to divest itself of 
jurisdiction of a person the custody of whom had been acquired 
illegally, thus depriving the alleged offender of his constitutional 
rights.41 The Second Circuit questioned "the continuing viability of 
the [Ker-Frisbie] doctrine in the light of the expanded concept of 
due process which bars the government from directly realizing the 
fruits of its deliberate misconduct prior to bringing an accused to 
trial."42 The court cited a number of cases and law review articles 
which define and explain this due process evolution.43 In United 
36Id. at 606; cf. Cook v. United States, 288 U.s. 102 (1933)(holding the Ker doctrine 
inapplicable when basis for relief is a treaty violation). In Cook, the Court stated: "To hold 
that adjudication may follow a wrongful seizure [of a vessell would go fur to nullifY the purpose 
and effect of the Treaty." 288 U.S. at 121-22. The treaty in question prescribed the limits 
within which the seizure of British vessels could occur. 
37 342 U.S. 519, 520, rehgdenied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952). 
38Id. 
39Id. at 522-23. 
40 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'gdenied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974). 
41 Id. at 275. 
42 Abraham Abramovsky & Steven]. Eagle, United States Policy in Apprehending Alleged 
Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction or Irregular Rendition?, 57 OREGON L. REv. 51, 56 
(1987). On remand, the district court held that the defendant had failed to prove his 
allegations and thus the court did not divest itself of jurisdiction. United States v. Toscanino, 
398 F. Supp. 916, 916--17 (E.D.N.Y 1975). 
43 See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 271-79 (citing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-431 
(1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961»; 
see also Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 
711 (1971); Robert M. Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 
CAL. L. REV. 579, 600 (1968). 
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States ex rei. Lujan v. Gengler, agents hired by the U.S. Customs 
Agency lured the alleged offender from Argentina to Bolivia, where 
he was arrested by Bolivian agents employed by the United States, 
and forcibly taken to New York.44 While the defendant Lujan did not 
claim that he was severely beaten during his abduction, he did claim 
that his abduction violated international law, Article 2.4 of the 
United Nations (UN) Charter,45 and Article 17 of the Organization 
of American States (OAS) Charter.46 Both articles provide for the 
inviolability of the territory of a state.47 In Toscanino, the Second 
Circuit observed that due to the U.S. ratification of these treaties, 
the United States was estopped from seizing persons from other 
nations.48 In Lujan, however, unlike Toscanino, the court relied on 
the fact that neither Argentina nor Bolivia as beneficiary states of 
these declarations had objected to the abduction and thus declared 
that no violation of international law had occurred.49 It will be 
recalled that in Alvarez-Machain, the Mexican government formally 
protested the abduction of Alvarez-Machain on at least two occa-
sions.50 
As pointed out by the court in Caro-Quintero, the Second and 
Ninth Circuits recognize the Toscanino exception to the Ker-Frisbie 
doctrineY The Second Circuit requires a court to divest itself of 
jurisdiction over the defendant where the defendant establishes 
governmental conduct "of the most shocking and outrageous 
kind."52 The Ninth Circuit frames its test as requiring that a defen-
dant make a "strong showing of grossly cruel and unusual barbarism 
inflicted on him by persons who can be characterized as paid agents 
of the United States."53 The District Court found that the allegations 
44510 F.2d 62. 63 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). 
45Id. at 65-66. Article 2.4 of the U.N. Charter states in part that "all members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity 
or political independence of any state .... " Id. at 67 n.6 (citing U.N. CHARTER art. 2, ~ 4). 
46Id. at 66. Article 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides in 
part that: "[t]he territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, 
of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or 
indirectly, on any grounds whatever .... " Id. at 66 n.7 (citing O.A.S. Charter art. 17). 
47Id. at 66-67 (noting that treaties proscribed use of force directly or indirectly in violation 
of a state's territorial integrity). 
48 See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 
1380 (1974). 
49 Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67. 
50 See supra note 4. 
51 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
52Id. (citing Gengler, 510 F.2d at 65-66). 
53Id. (citing United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 985 (1975); see also United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1980». 
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of mistreatment made by Alvarez-Machain were not sufficient so as 
to be characterized as barbarism, nor were such allegations believ-
able.54 Nonetheless, although discussed by the District Court, these 
cases were not even mentioned in the Supreme Court's majority 
opinion regarding due process. 
In this regard, the case of Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman55 is relevant. 
The defendant alleged that he was illegally arrested in Honduras by 
U.S. Marshals. He presented a writ of habeas corpus to the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Illinois further alleging 
that the United States violated the Honduran Constitution, interna-
tionallaw, and the U.S. Constitution by bringing him to the United 
States for trial,56 The defendant demanded his release to Honduras 
on the grounds of a due process violation.57 The court denied the 
defendant's motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing, and 
the defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 58 In the judgment of 
the Seventh Circuit, the only issue on appeal was the denial of his 
motion for an evidentiary hearing, which it affirmed.59 The Circuit 
Court did not comment on the violation of international law claim 
and held that since Honduras failed to protest the defendant's 
abduction, no violation of international law had occurred.60 On the 
issue of due process, the court referred to Toscanino and Rochin v. 
California. 61 In Rochin, the Supreme Court applied the due process 
laws to the whole course of the proceedings "in order to ascertain 
whether they offend those canons of decency and fairness which 
express the notions of justice of the English-speaking peoples even 
toward those charged with the most heinous offenses. "62 The offend-
ing evidence was extracted from the defendant by forcibly pum ping 
his stomach, which the Supreme Court regarded as a method which 
offended the due process clause and resulted in the reversal of his 
conviction.63 In Matta-Ballesteros, the Seventh Circuit essentially re-
jected Toscanino and stated that if the defendant could prove he was 
54Id. 
55896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990). 
56Id. Honduras does not extradite its own nationals and the defendant was a Honduran 
citizen. Id. 
57Id. at 257. 
58Id. at 256. 
59Id. at 257. 
60Id. at 259-60. 
61Id. at 260-61 (citing United States v. Toscanino, 560 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) and Rochin 
v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952». 
62 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 342 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1952». 
63Id. at 166-67, 174. 
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punished as a pre-trial detainee, he would be entitled to some relief 
under due process laws.64 The court pointed out that the defendant 
complained of being tortured only during his arrest. 65 
In short, an analysis of Ker, Frisbie, and the cases interpreting these 
decisions demonstrates that they are clearly distinguishable from 
Alvarez-Machain and hardly authority for the Alvarez-Machain deci-
sion. Bassiouni's treatise, in discussing the Ker-Frisbie doctrine, states 
that "the federal courts have generally assumed jurisdiction over an 
abducted defendant."66 Bassiouni cites twenty-five cases in illustra-
tion of this statement.67 All of the cases cited, with the exception of 
five, involve constitutional issues of due process and have nothing 
to do with customary international law, extradition treaties, or other 
international treaties.68 
United States v. Cadena involved the Convention of the High Seas69 
(Convention). In that case, the court found that the arrest of the 
defendants on the high seas did not violate the Convention because 
of the nationality of the vessel. The defendants were Colombian and 
Canadian, and neither Canada nor Colombia had ratified the Con-
vention. 70 The court recognized, however, that if the arrest had been 
made in violation of a treaty limiting the right of the United States 
to seize vessels of other sovereigns, the court would, for purposes of 
giving force to the treaty, dismiss the indictment, provided a timely 
plea contesting jurisdiction had been made. 71 The court in Cadena 
also recognized and stated that the Convention was a codification 
of international law. 72 The court stated, however, that a violation of 
international principles should not be remedied by an application 
of the exclusionary rule or by dismissal of the indictment, unless 
Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure interests were vio-
lated.73 
64 See Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 261. 
65 [d. 
66 BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 205 n.49. 
67 See id. 
68 The five cases dealing with international law are: United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Quesada, 512 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1974); 
and United States v. Sobel!, 244 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957), reh'g 
denied, 355 U.S. 920 (1958). 
69 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200. 
70 585 F.2d at 1260-61. 
71Id. at 1260. 
72Id. 
73 [d. at 1261. 
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The Cadena court added that the provision in the Convention 
relating to remedies for violations was limited to compensation for 
damages suffered as a consequence of a violation.74 The court 
pointed out that if this remedy was only available to citizens or 
vessels of member nations, citizens of non-member nations should 
not enjoy the benefits of exclusion or dismissal of indictments be-
cause of their nations' failure to ratifY. 75 The Toscanino case was not 
involved and was mentioned only in a footnote as an exception to 
Ker.76 
In United States v. Winter, the defendants, two American citizens, 
two Jamaican nationals, and one Bahamian national, were arrested 
on the high seas beyond U.S. territory. The defendants were not in 
the United States during the conspiracy where all the acts alleged 
in the indictment took place.77 The District Court's jurisdiction over 
the U.S. persons was challenged on the ground that their arrest took 
place beyond the jurisdiction in which the Coast Guard was permit-
ted to operate-that it was a violation of the applicable U.S. statute, 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, and 
customary international law. 78 
The Fifth Circuit held that the District Court had jurisdiction over 
the crime because although the acts were performed outside the 
United States, they were intended to produce, and did produce, 
detrimental effects within the United States.79 In other words, the 
Court applied the so-called "effects" rule as to the extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to the criminal acts involved.8o The Court also held that 
the jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants was not impaired 
by the fact that the defendants were arrested within the territory of 
the Bahamas in violation of a U.S. Treaty of Extradition with the 
United Kingdom.8! The Fifth Circuit relied on the Ker-Frisbie rule 
and rejected the Toscanino exception.82 The case did not mention 
customary international law beyond references to the aforemen-
tioned Convention nor did it mention the due process issue. 
In United States v. Qy,esada, the defendant Flores, a Venezuelan, 
asserted that his forcible abduction by U.S. government agents and 
74 [d. 
75 [d. 
76 [d. at 1260 n.13. 
77509 F.2d 975, 977-80 (5th Cir. 1975). 
78 [d. at 984. 
79 [d. at 983. 
80 See id. at 981-83. 
81 [d. at 984-89. 
82 [d. at 985-87. 
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his removal to the United States for trial violated the federal Kid-
napping Act, a treaty between the United States and Venezuela, and 
the Charter of the United Nations, thereby depriving him of due 
process and Fourth Amendment guarantees.83 Notwithstanding these 
contentions, the Fifth Circuit affirmed his conviction citing Ker, 
Frisbie, and Toscanino, the latter without comment.84 There was no 
specific discussion of the extradition treaty or of the due process 
issues, other than to confirm the application of the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine. 
In United States v. Herrera, the defendant had been convicted 
before the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for 
escaping from a federal penitentiary.85 The defendant appealed to 
the Fifth Circuit on the grounds that he had been illegally arrested 
in Peru and subsequently delivered to federal authorities in violation 
of the extradition process established under treaty between the 
United States and Peru.86 The Fifth Circuit refused to divest the 
District Court of jurisdiction over the defendant on the authority of 
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. The court rejected Toscanino, citing the 
"wide variance" between the facts of Herrera and those claims as-
serted in Toscanino. 87 While this is another example of the rejection 
of Toscanino by the Fifth Circuit, it is not a strong case. 
In United States v. Sobell, the District Court denied the defendant's 
motions for a hearing and for an order setting aside his conviction 
for espionage conspiracy.88 The defendant stated that Mexican secu-
rity police had deported him from Mexico to the United States.89 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the fact that the defendant 
had been returned to the U.S. authorities by Mexican security police 
did not impair the power of the District Court to try the defendant 
for espionage conspiracy.9o While the Second Circuit, speaking 
through Judge Medina, referred to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine as having 
continuing validity, it is noted that the Sobell decision predates Tos-
canino by approximately seventeen years.91 Furthermore, where a 
defendant is deported from one country for trial in another, and 
83 512 F.2d 1043,1045 (5th Cir. 1974). 
84Id. at 1045-46. 
85 504 F.2d 859, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1974). 
86Id. at 860. 
87Id. 
88244 F.2d 520, 520-21 (2d Cir.) , cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 
920 (1958). 
89Id. at 521. 
90Id. at 524-25. 
91Id. 
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there is no connivance between the local authorities and agents of 
the abducting state, such rendition is not regarded as unlawful or 
as an unlawful abduction under international law.92 Deportation is 
not considered illegal rendition.93 
The reliance by the Court in Alvarez-Machain upon the Ker-Frisbie 
doctrine fails to consider two federal court cases involving the search 
and seizure of vessels on the high seas. United States v. Ferris involved 
the Court's refusal to uphold the government's prosecution of the 
violators of the Prohibition and Tariff Acts because in seizing the 
defendants, the government violated a treaty between the United 
States and Panama.94 Under the terms ofthe treaty, the United States 
had the power to search and seize vessels of Panamanian registry 
within an hour's sailing time off the coast.95 In Ferris, Ferris and 
others had been seized 270 miles off the west coast of the United 
States from a ship of Panamanian registry.96 The Court held that the 
United States had violated the treaty by ignoring its limitation in 
seizing the ship outside of the jurisdiction conferred by the treaty.97 
Thus, the United States had imposed a limitation on its power in 
the treaty, and by ignoring this limitation, had thus violated the 
treaty. Similarly, in Cook v. United States, a British ship was seized by 
the U.S. Coast Guard on the high seas in violation of a treaty 
between Great Britain and the United States.98 The Court found that 
because of the seizure, the courts had no jurisdiction for forfeiture 
proceedings over the seized property on the theory that the U.S. 
government itself lacked power to seize; therefore, the self-imposed 
territorial limitation upon the government's own authority pre-
cluded the court's jurisdiction in subsequent forfeiture proceed-
ings.99 
Under the teachings ofthese two cases, the principle appears that 
if the government limits its power by a treaty and then acts beyond 
that power, it is a violation of that treaty. This principle appears 
applicable in the case of extradition treaties and to this case in a 
different manner, raising the question whether the treaty is violated 
when ignored. The Court does not explain why an extradition treaty 
92 Se;; BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 196. 
93Id. 
94 19 F.2d 925, 926 (N.D. Cal. 1929). 
95Id. 
96Id. 
97Id. at 927. 
98 288 U.S. 102, 121-22 (1933). 
99Id. 
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does not have the same effect as another type of treaty in limiting 
the government's power. 
B. Violation of International Law 
It is "black letter" law that in the absence of an extradition treaty, 
the forcible abduction of a person from within the territory of his 
state of citizenship without the consent of that state by the govern-
ment agents of another state is a violation of the first state's sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, and legal processes, and is thus a violation 
of international law. loo There are possible exceptions, however, one 
of which may be the kidnapping of terrorists. lOl It seems that under 
Article 51, "self-defense" means an "armed attack" against a Member 
of the United Nations. This appears to exclude such things as the 
right of a State to take appropriate action to "protect its citizens." A 
J()()BASSJOUNI, supra note 3, at 191-92 (citing Argentina's protest against Israel for the 
kidnapping of Eichmann and the Security Council's action, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 
for Apr-June 1960, at 35, U.N. Doc. S/4349). At Argentina's request, the Security Council 
passed a resolution condemning the abduction of Eichmann by Israeli agents. The United 
States agreed to the resolution. Bassiouni notes that another well-known case may also be 
characterized as violative of international law. Regina v. Governor of Bixton Prison, [1963] 2 
Q.B. 243 reprinted in 8 BRIT. INT'L L. CASES 477 (1971) (deportation from Israel at U.S. request 
through England to the United States used as disguised extradition because one who commits 
espionage was not subject to extradition from Israel); see also United States v. Toscanino, 500 
F.2d 267, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1974) (in discussing the Eichmann case, the Court stated, "The 
[Security Council's] resolution merely recognized a long standing principle of international 
law that abductions by one state of persons located within the territory of another violate the 
territorial sovereignty of the second state and are redressable usually by the return of the 
person kidnapped."). Some mention should be made of the 1989 abduction of the President 
of Panama, General Manuel Noriega for trial in the United States on drug trafficking. The 
Court in sustaining in personam jurisdiction over Noriega relied on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine as 
an "international legal doctrine." This reasoning is incorrect because the Kerdecision clearly 
identifies the doctrine as a "constitutional doctrine" and not as a principle of international 
law. Mention should also be made of the U.S. attempt to abduct the Palestinian hijackers of 
the Italian ship Achille Lauro in 1985. The hijackers were later tried in Italy after interception 
of their escape plane from Egypt by U.S. fighter planes. 
101 Halberstam, supra note 1, at 736 n.5 (kidnapping exception would be based on Article 
51). Article 51 states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, 
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right 
of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not 
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added). 
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loose interpretation, contrary to the express provisions of Article 51, 
might well include protection of citizens of the United States from 
the importation of drugs. This would be an expansion of the express 
intention of the Article, however. A more literal construction of this 
provision may well be supported by reference to the United Nations 
Convention against the Taking of Hostages,102 which requires that 
any suspected offender be delivered to the authorities of the country 
in which he is found ''without exception whatsoever and whether or 
not the offense was committed" in that country. A forceful abduction 
of an individual, a native of state A from his residence in state A, 
violates international legal processes and the human rights of the 
individual involved. lo3 
It is an established rule of international law that the forcible 
abduction of an individual for trial by the abducting state, being per 
se a violation of customary international law, creates an obligation 
to restore the person so apprehended upon demand of the country 
from which he has been taken.104 In addition, where the offended 
state protests the other state's action, the individual acquires deriva-
tive rights from the state and thus has standing to enforce the terms 
of any extradition treaty that may exist.105 In analyzing the case, the 
majority in Alvarez-Machain stated: 
Our first inquiry must be whether the abduction of respon-
dent from Mexico violated the extradition treaty between 
the United States and Mexico. If we conclude that the 
treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule 
in Ker applies, and the court need not inquire as to how 
respondent came before it. lo6 
102 U.N. Doc. A/34/819, art. 8 (1979). 
103 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 3, at 190; see also Glennon, supra note 1, at 746 n.l (citing 
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.!J. (ser. A.) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated that the foremost restriction imposed by international law upon 
a State is that it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.». 
104 Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregulo:r Extradition, 36 BRIT. YB. INT'L LAW 279, 
293 (1960); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 205 (8th ed. 1955); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 432 cmt. c (1987). Harvard Research in International Law, 
Draft Convention of Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, Comment to Article 16, 29 AM. j. INT'L L. 
439,623 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Draft Convention]. In the Vincenti affair, Charles Vincenti 
was pursued and captured by an officer of the Department of Justice and two Internal Revenue 
agents in British territorial waters off the coast of Bimini. The United States government 
acknowledged that his arrest had been unlawful and revoked the charges against him. 1 GREEN 
H. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 624 (1940). 
105 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2203 n.26 (1992) (Stevens, j., 
dissenting); if. Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255,259 (7th Cir. 1990); United States 
v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1981). 
106 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. 
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With these words the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed from its con-
sideration almost 100 years of customary international law and in 
effect ignored the landmark case of The Paquete Habana.107 There 
the Court said: 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appro-
priate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending 
on it are duly presented for their determination. For this 
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling ex-
ecutive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be 
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as 
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commenta-
tors, who by years of labor, research and experience, have 
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the sub-
jects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by 
judicial tribunals, not for the speculation of their authors 
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy 
evidence of what the law really is. 108 
The Paquete Habana Court also stated that courts should take judi-
cial notice and give effect to the law of nations. 109 
The Alvarez-Machain Court should not have ignored Article 2.4 
of the UN Charter and Article 17 of the OAS Charter which became 
the "supreme law of the land" by their ratification by the United 
States. The principles contained therein are thus part offederallaw. 
The Alvarez-Machain Court should have taken judicial notice of 
these principles and applied them to the case. 
In addition, from the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law, the Supreme Court might have considered the following: 
None of the international human rights conventions to 
date ... provides that forcible abduction or irregular ex-
tradition is a violation of international human rights law. 
However, but Articles 3, 5, and 9 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights as well as Articles 7, 9 and 10 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights might 
be invoked in support of such a view. In 1981 the Human 
Rights Committee established pursuant to Article 28 of the 
Covenant decided that the abduction of a Uruguayan refu-
107 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
108 Id. at 700. 
109 Id. at 711-12. 
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gee from Argentina by Uruguayan security officers consti-
tuted arbitrary arrest and detention in violation of Article 
9(I)Yo 
It has been stated that the customary international law question 
was not presented properly before the Supreme Court.lll The Mexi-
can government had protested Alvarez-Machain's abduction on that 
ground, as well as on the ground that the abduction violated the 
Extradition Treaty.ll2 The issue of international law was briefly raised 
by Justice O'Connor at the oral argument. ll3 
In this connection perhaps the most astounding remarks of the 
majority opinion are the following: 
Respondent and his amici may be correct that respondent's 
abduction was "shocking" ... and that it may be in viola-
tion of general international law principles. Mexico has 
protested the abduction of respondent through diplomatic 
notes ... , and the decision whether respondent should be 
returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is a 
matter for the Executive Branch. 1l4 
It is a strange corruption of the separation of powers doctrine 
established by our Constitution for the Executive Branch to become 
a judicial organ to determine the rules of customary international 
law, particularly in light of the decision of The Paquete Habana 
requiring courts to apply principles of international law in the ab-
sence of a treaty or a controlling executive or legislative act.ll5 The 
Court made no attempt to produce evidence of such an act. The 
Paquete Habana was just ignored. 
One other factor should be noted with respect to the require-
ments of jurisdiction to adjudicate. ll6 Comment (a) to Section 432 
of Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States provides that: 
110 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED), 
§ 432, Reporters' Notes 1 
III Jacques Semmelman, International Decisions: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 811, 815 n.22 (1992). 
112 See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 604, 608 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
113 Semmel man, supra note 111, at 817 n.30. 
114 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2196. 
115 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
116 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, 
supra note 110 § 432 cmt. a. 
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if a state would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate with 
respect to a particular claim, for instance because the act 
did not take place or cause harm within its territory, the 
state may not bring its criminal enforcement machinery to 
bear on the person accused of the act except to assist in 
the law enforcement efforts of a state with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate. ll7 
261 
In the Alvarez-Machain case, of course, the U.S. courts lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction inasmuch as the crime alleged was committed in 
Mexico, where Alvarez-Machain should be tried and where Article 
9 of the Extradition Treaty so provides. It should be noted that the 
Ninth Circuit, in the case of United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, dealt with 
the issue of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States over 
criminal activity taking place outside of the United States.ns In so 
doing, the court stated that generally speaking there is no constitu-
tional bar to the extraterritorial application of the U.S. penallaws1l9 
and that the court must examine the congressional intent, expressed 
or implied, to determine whether it is intended that a given statute 
have extraterritorial application.120 The court also noted that it 
should insure that an extraterritorial application of U.S. law does 
not violate international law.l2l The court also mentioned three 
international law principles which, if applicable, would permit such 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to be exercised.122 The three principles 
mentioned were: first, "territorial," which would permit jurisdiction 
over crimes occurring within or without the United States as long 
as they had effects within the United States;123 the second such 
principle is denominated "protective," that is to say that the jurisdic-
tion would be based on whether the national interest or national 
117 Id.; see also Draft Convention, supra note 104, app. 3 (containing the treaty on interna-
tional penal law signed in Montevideo Jan. 23. 1889, the first article of which provides: "Crimes 
are tried by the courts and punished by the laws of the nation on whose territory they are 
perpetrated, whatever may be the nationality of the actor, of the victim, or of the injured 
party." Neither one of these instruments were ever signed or ratified by the United States.). 
118 940 F.2d 1200, 1203-06 (9th Cir. 1991). 
119Id. at 1204. 
120Id. United States v. Bowman is authority for the proposition that criminal statutes dealing 
with effects that are directly injurious to the government and are capable of perpetration 
without regard to a particular locality ought to be construed as applicable to U.S. citizens 
upon the high seas or in foreign countries though there be no express declaration to that 
effect. 260 U.S. 94, 97-100 (1922). 
121 Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d at 1205. 
122Id. 
123Id. at 1205-D6. 
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security is threatened or injured by the extraterritorial conduct;124 
the third principle is "passive personality," that is to say that the 
Court may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the 
nationality of the victim.125 These principles are applied with those 
of "comity," "fairness," ')ustice," "reasonableness," or more directly, 
"the balancing of national interests."126 The Felix-Gutierrez Court 
found that in this case, which involved the same basic facts as 
Alvarez-Machain, all these principles were satisfied, after having 
found that Congress intended the statute with which the accused 
was charged with violating to have extraterritorial application. 127 
In Felix-Gutierrez, the defendant entered the United States on his 
own,128 whereas Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped, a difference which 
may be an important factor.129 In addition, while the Felix-Gutierrez 
court mixed together the passive personality, territorial, and protec-
tive principles to assert jurisdiction, it is unclear whether passive 
personality, standing alone, would be enough of a basis to assert 
jurisdiction.130 Alvarez-Machain is not a drug trafficker; therefore, it 
would be difficult to substantiate allegations that his actions had 
effects within the United States or were directed against the U.S. 
government. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, and the various attempts to class-
ifY extraterritorial jurisdiction of criminal conduct occurring outside 
of the United States under international law, the governing princi-
ple remains that a state cannot take measures on the territory of 
another state by way of enforcement of national laws, without con-
sent of the latter as stated by the following: 
Persons may not be arrested, a summons may not be 
served, police or tax investigations may not be mounted, 
orders for production of documents may not be executed, 
on the territory of another state, except under the terms 
1241d. 
1251d. 
1261d. at 1205. 
1271d. at 1203-06. 
1281d. at 1203. 
129 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992). 
130 Christopher J. Blakesley & OUo Lagodny, Finding Harmony Amidst Disagreement Over 
Extradition, jurisdiction, The Rnle of Human Rights, and Issues of Extraterritoriality Under 
International Criminal Law, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1, 24 (1991) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 30(2) (1965) and 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 402 
(1987)). 
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of a treaty or other consent given. In the field of economic 
regulation, and especially anti-trust legislation, controversy 
has arisen. It is probable that states will acquiesce in the 
exercise of enforcement jurisdiction in matters governed 
by the objective territorial principle of jurisdiction. Courts 
in the United States, for example, in the Alcoa and Watch-
makers of Switzerland cases, have taken the view that when-
ever activity abroad has consequences or effects within the 
United States which are contrary to local legislation then 
the American courts may make orders requiring the dispo-
sition of patent rights and other property of foreign corpo-
rations, the reorganization of industry in another country, 
the production of documents, and so on. The American 
doctrine appears to be restricted to agreements abroad 
intended to have effects within the United States and actu-
ally having such effects. Such orders may be enforced by 
action within the United States against the individuals or 
property present within die territorial jurisdiction, and the 
policy adopted goes beyond the normal application of the 
objective territorial principle. More recently United States 
courts have adopted a principle of the balancing of the 
various national interests involved, which, though unhelp-
fully vague, could result in some mitigation of the cruder 
aspects of the "effects doctrine. "131 
263 
In recent years, the United States has increasingly resorted to the 
apprehension of persons in circumvention of traditional extradition 
procedures in order to obtain custody of alleged offen ders abroad. 132 
These abductions raise three legal issues: first, whether they violate 
U.S. law; second, whether they violate the law of the state of asylum; 
and finally, whether they violate international law. 
C. The Extradition Treaty 
The Supreme Court's interpretation in Alvarez-Machain of the 
Extradition Treaty is flawed. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist is 
correct when he states that "[e]xtradition treaties exist so as to 
impose mutual obligations to surrender individuals in certain 
defined sets of circumstances, following established procedures,"133 
131 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 307-08 (4th ed. 1990). 
132 See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 42, at 51-52. 
133 United States v. A1varez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2194 (1992). 
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he does not specifY what the certain defined sets of circumstances 
are. According to at least one international law scholar, the reason 
U.S. extradition treaties exist are to recapture fugitives who have 
committed crimes in the ')urisdiction" of one of the Contracting 
Parties and who flees to the territory of the other Contracting 
Party.134 Extradition was defined by Chief Justice Fuller as: "The 
surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or 
convicted of an offense outside of its own territory, and within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try 
and punish him demands the surrender."135 
The policy behind extradition treaties is to require the production 
of evidence of criminality sufficient to warrant the apprehension of 
the fugitive in the country where he seeks asylum.136 This requires 
judicial review and a determination as to the adequacy and 
sufficiency of the evidence.137 It may be inferred that extradition 
treaties require the imposition of the judiciary between the law 
enforcement authorities of one country and the deprivation of an 
individual's liberty in another. Article 3 of the Extradition Treaty 
embodies these principles: 
Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found 
sufficient, according to the laws of the requested Party, 
either to justifY the committal for trial of the person sought 
if the offense of which he has been accused had been 
committed in that place or to prove that he is the person 
convicted by the courts of the requesting Party.13S 
The Extradition Treaty imposes the requested Party's judiciary 
between the law enforcement authorities of the requesting Party and 
the fugitive. 139 One of the purposes of extradition treaties, therefore, 
is the establishment of international legal process, cooperation, and 
principles of comity. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to begin his analysis with the as-
sumption that the Extradition Treaty is dormant until one state has 
requested the extradition of an accused residing in the other state. 140 
134 2 CHARLES C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND ApPLIED BY 
THE UNITED STATES 1043 (2d rev. ed. 1951) 
135Id. at 1012 (quoting Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902)). 
136Id. at 1016. 
137Id. at 1018. 
138 Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, arts. 3, 31. 
139 See id. 
140 See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2194 (1992). 
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When the Extradition Treaty has accordingly been "invoked," its 
terms thereafter prohibit certain state conduct, such as prosecuting 
the defendant for crimes other than those enumerated in the 
Treaty. 141 
If an apprehension is achieved by means other than by formal 
treaty rendition, a court will not look into the state conduct em-
ployed in obtaining custody over a defendant. 142 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist cannot maintain this legal fiction which he calls "abduc-
tions outside of the Treaty."143 As the District Court found, Alvarez-
Machain became entitled to raise his rights under the Extradition 
Treaty when the Mexican government protested his abduction be-
cause extradition treaties are self-executing. 144 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist decides, without directly stating so, that the defendant 
may only raise the terms of a treaty as a defense following his 
extradition according to treaty procedure.145 Such a proposition, 
that only the prosecuting state may vest treaty rights in the defen-
dant if it chooses to follow treaty procedure, while an injured state 
may not vest treaty rights in its abducted national through diplo-
matic protest, is not supported by the terms of the Extradition Treaty 
or any other authority. There is no provision in the Extradition 
Treaty giving a prosecuting state the only right to invoke its terms. 
The requested Party, according to a number of provisions, may 
refuse or delay extradition. 146 Thus, the notion that the Extradition 
Treaty lies dormant until a prosecuting state invokes its terms is 
absurd on its face. 
When Chief Justice Rehnquist interprets Article 22(1) of the Ex-
tradition Treaty, he chooses one of two plausible meanings. The two, 
however, are not necessarily exclusive. Article 22 (1) states that it 
"shall apply to offenses specified in Article 2 [including murder] 
committed before and after this Treaty enters into force."147 While 
Alvarez-Machain argued that Article 22 makes application of the 
Treaty mandatory for those offenses, the Court construed that the 
Article's sole purpose was to make the Treaty applicable to crimes 
1411d. at 2191 (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886». 
142 See id. at 2194. 
143 See id. 
144 United Statesv. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 607 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
145 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2195-97. 
146 ld. at 2198 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (discussing provisions conveying rights to requested 
state) . 
147 Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 22. 
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committed both before and after the Treaty came into effect.148 The 
reader is tempted to pass over this interpretation without much 
thought. At second glance, however, Article 22 is entitled, "Scope of 
Application,"149 and it is therefore quite obvious that the drafters 
wanted to make an imperative statement about more than the tem-
poral application of the Treaty when they made reference to Article 
2.150 The drafters could have made no reference to Article 2 at all 
and achieved the same effect advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
States are normally under no obligation to extradite their nation-
als. For many years, many countries excluded nationals from extra-
dition obligations. 
Under the laws of many countries and under many extra-
dition treaties, the extradition of nationals of the requested 
State is prohibited or is nonobligatory. This exemption of 
nationals from extradition may result from specific prohi-
bition of their extradition law or from a provision that the 
law or treaty providing for extradition applies only to ali-
ens. lSl 
The Court's interpretation of Article 9 of the Extradition Treaty 
lacks any semblance of a logical foundation. Article 9 of the Treaty 
provides: 
1. Neither Contracting Party shall be bound to deliver up 
its own nationals, but the executive authority of the re-
quested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that 
Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, 
it be deemed proper to do so. 
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
this Article, the requested Party shall submit the case to its 
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, pro-
vided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense. ls2 
148 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193. 
149Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 22. 
150 [d. Article 2 states: "Extradition shall take place, subject to this Treaty, for wilful acts 
which fall within any of the clauses of the Appendix and are punishable in accordance with 
the laws of both Contracting Parties by deprivation of liberty the maximum of which shall not 
be less than one year." [d. art. 2. 
151 6 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw § 18 (1968). 
152 Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 9. 
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The Court, without first examining this Article in the context of the 
Treaty, leaps to the meaning of extradition treaties in general. I53 
Chief Justice Rehnquist states: "Extradition treaties exist so as to 
impose mutual obligations to surrender individuals in certain 
defined sets of circumstances, following established procedures."154 
He fails to state, however, that Article 9 provides an exception to the 
general obligations established by these treaties. He also fails to state 
that this exception is applicable to Alvarez-Machain and that the 
Mexican government, from the beginning, and upon formal agree-
ment with the United States, had no duty to extradite Alvarez-
Machain to stand trial in the United States. ISS 
Essentially, these treaties reflect the intention of the Contracting 
Parties to affirm their respective territorial integrity. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist espouses the position that if the Contracting Parties had 
wanted to restrict their jurisdiction in respect to the other's nationals 
to prevent one nation from abducting nationals of the other nation 
for the purposes of prosecution without some form of the judicial 
process established in either Articles 3 or 9, they would have drafted 
language doing so, as reflected in the Draft Convention on Jurisdic-
tion with Respect to Crime.156 The Court fails to note that the same 
Draft Convention, in Appendix 3, contains the Treaty on Interna-
tional Penal Law, signed at Montevideo, January 23, 1889, the first 
article of which provides: "Crimes are tried by the courts and pun-
ished by the laws of the nation on whose territory they are perpe-
trated, whatever may be the nationality of the actor, of the victim, 
or of the injured party. "157 This article reflects a rule of in ternational 
153 See Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194. 
154 [d. 
155 In a prior extradition treaty, the United States made a reservation to a duty to extradite 
or prosecute its own nationals. See The Convention on Extradition, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 
3111, T.S. 882, reprinted in 3 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 152 (1969). 
156 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-95 n.13 (quoting Draft Convention, supra note 104, 
art. 16). The Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime provides: 
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish 
any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority 
by recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention 
without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been 
violated by such measures. 
Draft Convention, supra note 104, art. 16. 
157 Draft Convention, supra note 104, app. 3. 
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law. 158 When it is applied to Alvarez-Machain' s case, the international 
law of extradition treaties dictates that he be returned to Mexico, 
the situs of the crime, in order to stand trial. 
D. Supervisory Power 
Alvarez-Machain sought dismissal in the District Court of the 
indictment under the Court's supervisory power. 159 The Court stated 
that a court may exercise its supervisory power "as necessary to 
preserve judicial integrity and deter illegal conduct."160 The Court 
must not allow itself to be made an "accomplice in willful disobedi-
ence of the law. "161 The Court refers in this connection to McNabb 
v. United States. 162 The District Court did not rest its decision upon 
its supervisory power, but said the following with respect to the 
conduct of the DEA in this and other cases: 
However, the Court admonishes the DEA to heed Judge 
Oakes' [sic] warning made fifteen years ago, which this 
Court now adopts: "[W] e can reach a time when in the 
interest of establishing and maintaining civilized standards 
of procedure and evidence, we may wish to bar jurisdiction 
in an abduction case as a matter not of constitutional law 
but in the exercise of our supervisory power .... To my 
mind the Government in its laudable interest of stopping 
the international drug traffic is by these repeated abduc-
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, supra note 110, § 432. 
159 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
160 [d. 
161 [d. 
162 318 U.S. 332 (1943); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub-
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a govern-
ment oflaws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the 
law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the 
government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man 
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration 
of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may 
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring 
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set 
its face. 
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis,]., dissenting). 
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tions invItmg exercise of that supervisory power in the 
in terest of the greater good of preserving respect for the 
law."163 
E. Political Question Doctrine 
269 
The suggestion made by the Court that the return of Alvarez-
Machain to Mexico is a matter for the Executive Branch suggests 
that the Court wished to take refuge behind the "political question 
doctrine."164 This doctrine is generally understood to mean that the 
courts will steer clear of decisions which might raise questions of 
political concerns and thus potentially embarrass the Executive 
Branch. It is not difficult to see that a court's challenge to an 
Executive law enforcement agency's action outside or in disregard 
of a treaty migh t be poten tially embarrassing to the Executive and 
a threat to the Executive's foreign policy domain. 
The applicability of this doctrine in cases of extraterritorial law 
enforcement action would seem to cause those very harms the 
doctrine is supposed to eliminate. Where a treaty is involved, pre-
sumably negotiated by the Executive, ratified by Congress, and by 
virtue of the Constitution, becoming the "supreme law of the land," 
any court judgment requiring the adherence to the terms of such 
treaty would confirm the intention of the Executive Branch's integ-
rity in entering into the treaty on behalf of the United States. 
In this regard, it should be noted that the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Rauscher-65 held that U.S. courts are barred from 
trying a fugitive surrendered by Great Britain for a crime other than 
that for which he had been extradited. In reaching this decision the 
court rejected the argument that" [t] he rights of persons extradited 
under the treaty cannot be enforced by the judicial branch of the 
government and that they can only appeal to the executive branches 
of the treaty governmen ts for redress." This court was the same court 
which decided Ker and the opinion was written by the same justice. 
Rauscher was also cited in the majority opinion of the Court in 
Alvarez-Machain, so the Court presumably was aware of its holding. 166 
This position is consistent with the position taken by the Supreme 
163 Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 615 (citing United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975) (Oakes,]., concurring)). 
I&lUnited States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992). 
165119 U.S. 430, 432 (1886). 
166 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191. 
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Court in Cook v. United States167 to the effect that Ker v. Illinois168 is 
inapplicable where a treaty of the United States is directly in-
volved. 169 This is also consistent with the traditional doctrine that: 
"[t]he construction of treaties is judicial in its nature, and courts 
when called upon to act should be careful to see that international 
engagements are faithfully kept and observed."170 
Additionally, in the Alvarez-Machain case, the Executive Branch 
never issued an official statement but apparently condoned the 
illegal apprehension of Alvarez-Machain and his removal by force 
from his country of domicile, notwithstanding the violation of the 
Extradition Treaty or of principles of customary international law. 
The application of the political question doctrine in this case seems 
inappropriate and illogical. 
F. International Effect of the Decision 
It is now generally known that the Alvarez-Machain decision has 
had a very frightening effect in other countries.l7l For example, in 
Venezuela, Foreign Minister Ochoa Antich has asked Congress, now 
discussing constitutional amendments, to write into law a ban on 
extradition and prohibiting illegal abductions which the United 
States claims the right to do; Colombia and Bolivia have joined the 
protest against this decision. 172 The president of the American Soci-
ety ofInternational Law has also criticized the decision. 173 The OAS 
has recently challenged and registered its disagreement with the 
Alvarez-Machain decision through its legal committee. 
OPINION OF THE IN1ERAMERICAN JUDICIAL 
COMMJTTEEl74 
As requested, the present opinion analyzes the judgment 
of the United States Supreme Court from the standpoint 
of its compliance with International Public Law. The Com-
167 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
168119 U.S. 436 (1886). 
169 See Cook, 288 U.S. at 121-22. 
170 See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921). 
I7I See David O. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance, A.B.A. j., Nov. 1992, at 50; see also Valerie 
Epps, Forcible Abdudion, Jurisdidion And Treaty Interpretation, INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK, Oct. 
1992, at 6. 
172 See Washington Letter; LATIN AM. REGIONAL REP., (Latin Am. News., London, England), 
July 30, 1992. 
173 Will the U.S. Supreme Court Fail International Law, AM. SOC'y INT'L L. (Aug.-Sept., 1992). 
174 Source on file with the authors. 
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mittee does not opine on the compliance of said judgment 
with the United States internal law but points out that it is 
an indisputable norm of International Law that the dispo-
sitions of a state regarding its internal law cannot be in-
voked to elude fulfillment of international obligations. 
[The First Seven Paragraphs Are Deleted. These para-
graphs deal with the facts of the case and the international 
law issues thereby.] 
8. The Committee had in mind that the State is respon-
sible for the violation of its international obligations, not 
only by the Executive but also by any of its organs, includ-
ing the Judiciary and that the acts or omissions of the same 
may constitute transgressions of International Law, 
whether by themselves or by confirming or leaving without 
remedy the violations of other state-organs. 
9. As to the facts, the Committee has based itself exclu-
sively on that which has been affirmed as indisputable in 
the judgment being studied. Thus, it considers it a fact that 
the Mexican citizen Humberto Alvarez Machain was kid-
napped from Mexican territory and brought to United 
States territory and that the responsibility for that kidnap-
ping lies with the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) , a governmental organ of the United States of 
America which is in charge of the war against drug traffic. 
The Committee, in the same way, considers beyond any 
argument or doubt that the kidnapping in question is a 
grave violation of Public International Law, since it consti-
tutes a transgression of Mexico's territorial sovereignty. 
The responsibility of the United States of America for the 
DEA's conduct in this case is not argued either, since, 
having full knowledge of the same, it has abstained from 
correcting it. 
10. In accordance with the norms that rule the state's 
responsibility in International Law, every State which vio-
lates an international obligation must redress the conse-
quences of said violation. The intention is to return things 
to the state they were before the transgression occurred. 
Only to the extent that this becomes impossible, or that 
the injured party consents to it, would there be an alterna-
tive form of redress. 
11. In virtue of the foregoing, it is clear that the United 
271 
272 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XVI, No.2 
States of America, as responsible for the violation of the 
sovereignty of Mexico caused by the kidnapping of the 
Mexican citizen Humberto Alvarez Machain, is obligated 
to repatriate him, without prejudice of other reparations 
its conduct may necessitate. 
12. An analysis of the United States Supreme Courtjudg-
ment brings the Committee to the conclusion that the 
judgment is contrary to the rules of International Law for 
the following reasons: 
a) Because by affirming the United States of America's 
jurisdiction to try Mexican citizen Humberto Alvarez 
Machain, forcibly removed from his country of origin, the 
Court fails to recognize the obligation of the United States 
of America to return him to the country from whose juris-
diction he was abducted. 
b) Because by maintaining that the United States of 
America is free to try persons abducted by action of its 
government in the territory of another state, unless it is 
expressly prohibited to do so in a current treaty between 
the United State and the country in question, it fails to 
recognize a fundamental principle of International Law, 
i.e. respect for the territorial sovereignty of States. 
c) Because by interpreting the Extradition Treaty be-
tween the United States of America and Mexico in the 
sense that it does not impede the abduction of persons, it 
ignores the rule by which treaties must be interpreted in 
accordance with their objective and in relation to the ap-
plicable principles and regulations of International Law. 
13. Finally, the Committee observes that if the principles 
invoked in the judgment being studied were to be carried 
to their ultimate consequences, international judicial or-
der would be irreparably broken, when each State is given 
faculty to violate with impunity the territorial sovereignty 
of the other States. The Committee must also emphasize 
the incompatibility of the practice of abduction with due 
process belonging to every person, regardless of how grave 
may be the crime of which he is being accused, and which 
constitute one of the human rights honored by Interna-
tional Law. 
This Opinion was approved by nine votes in favor and 
one abstention. 
Rio de Janeiro, August 15,1992 
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It would appear from the analysis of Alvarez-Machain set forth 
above, that the Alvarez-Machain decision is not representative of the 
current state of the law regarding the rights of state B to forcibly 
abduct an individual citizen and resident of state A to be tried in 
state B for criminal acts performed in state A in violation of an 
extradition treaty currendy in effect between state A and state B, 
even though the treaty in question contains no express provisions 
prohibiting such abduction, and the abduction has been protested 
by state A It is a rule of international law that a state must not 
perform acts of sovereignty in the territory of another state without 
the consent of such state. Hence the arrest of a fugitive criminal by 
the officers of a state in the territory of another is prima facie, a 
breach of international law. 
Furthermore, the existence of an extradition treaty is regarded as 
requiring its strict observance to obtain the delivery of an alleged 
offender wanted by state B and found in state A175 Justice Stevens, 
who wrote the dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Machain, correcdy 
states current law on this subject. 176 
The Court relied heavily upon the Ker decision in the Alvarez-
Machain and Rauscher cases.177 In both Ker and Rauscher, the point 
was clearly made that an extradition treaty constituted the means by 
which the United States could obtain jurisdiction over the defendant 
within the territorial jurisdiction of another state, a party to such 
treaty. 178 
The Alvarez-Machain case comes as a serious shock to the inter-
175 See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,429 (1886). 
I76 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2197-206 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
177 See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 
1380 (1974); United States ex rel. Lujan V. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 63 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (representing a more current view of due process and other applicable 
law). 
178 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2200 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Rauscher; 119 U.S. at 
429). 
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national bar. The statement of Justice Stevens in his dissenting 
opinion says it all. 
When done without consent of the foreign government, 
abducting a person from a foreign country is a gross viola-
tion of international law and gross disrespect for a norm 
high in the opinion of mankind. It is a blatant violation of 
the territorial integrity of another state; it eviscerates the 
extradition system (established by a comprehensive net-
work of treaties involving virtually all states) .179 
This country, the cradle of liberty, justice, and "the rule of law" 
demonstrates by this decision a disregard for the rule of law appar-
ently for reasons of political or administrative expediency, shaking 
the very basis of its image and the principles of fundamental human 
rights it proclaims to the world at large.18o 
This decision cannot be permitted to stand. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current status of the case is as follows. Alvarez-Machain filed 
a petition for rehearing en bane with the Ninth Circuit. His petition 
was denied,!81 however, and the Ninth Circuit remanded his case to 
the District Court for trial. I82 The District Court, hearing the defen-
dant's Motion for acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evi-
dence, granted the Motion and discharged Alvarez-Machain.183 Al-
though the District Court released the defendant, the Supreme 
1791d. at 2202 (citing Louis Henkin, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. 
MARSHALL L. REv. 215, 231 (1992». 
180 See William J. Brennan, Jr., International Due Process and The Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1258, 
1258 (1962). 
181 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992). 
1820n November 3, 1992, the Ninth Circuit amended this order, denying a hearing of 
Alvarez-Machain's customary international law claims based on the Ninth Circuit's belief that 
the District Court's opinion precluded consideration of such claims, even if the Supreme 
Court's decision had not. 
The District Court never ruled on the customary international law issue because Alvarez-
Machain did not raise it in his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and further, the 
District Court found the Extradition Treaty had been violated, making it unnecessary to 
consider customary international law principles. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. 
Supp. 599,614 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
Alvarez-Machain's attorneys subsequently filed a request for leave to amend his motion to 
dismiss based on principles of customary international law in the District Court. This motion 
was denied. At the same time, however, Alvarez-Machain's attorneys have presented a petition 
to the Ninth Circuit for a clarification of their order to the effect that the District Court is 
not precluded from considering the issue of customary international law. 
183United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. CR-87-422-(G)-ER (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14,1992). 
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Court's opinion remains case law and should nevertheless be ad-
dressed. 
There are several possible remedies which should be analyzed. 
The authors of this article are inclined toward further judicial ac-
tion, whether at the Supreme Court level, or alternatively, at the 
international level. 
A. Petition for Rehearing 
A motion must be made immediately for leave to file an untimely 
petition for a rehearing of this case with the Supreme Court. This 
motion would be made on behalf of the Mexican Bar Association, 
the Mexican Government acting through its Foreign Office and the 
Ministry of Justice, the Canadian Bar Association and the American 
Bar Association, together with the support of the In ter-American Bar 
Association, the International Bar Association (American Branch) 
and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (both the 
International and Inter-American Law Committees). 
1. In General 
Rule 51 of the Rules of Court184 permits the filing of petitions for 
rehearing by unsuccessful litigants within twenty-five days of the 
entry of either (1) an adverse judgment or decision on the merits, 
or (2) an order denying certiorari. It is largely self-explanatory and 
reads as follows: 
l. A petition for rehearing of any judgment or decision 
other than one on a petition for writ of certiorari, shall be 
filed within 25 days after the judgment or decision, unless 
the time is shortened or enlarged by the Court or aJustice. 
Forty copies, produced in conformity with Rule 33, must 
be filed (except where the party is proceeding in forma 
pauperis under Rule 46), accompanied by proof of service 
as prescribed by Rule 28. Such petition must briefly and 
distinctly state its grounds. Counsel must certify that the 
petition is presented in good faith and not for delay; one 
copy of the certificate shall bear the manuscript signature 
of counsel. A petition of rehearing is not subject to oral 
argument, and will not be granted except at the instance 
of a Justice who concurred in the judgment or decision 
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and with the concurrence of a majority of the Court. See 
also Rule 52.2. 
2. A petition for rehearing of an order denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari shall comply with all the form and 
filing requirements of paragraph 1, but its grounds must 
be limited to intervening circumstances of substantial or 
controlling effect or to other substantial grounds not pre-
viously presented. Counsel must certifY that the petition is 
restricted to the grounds specified in this paragraph and 
that it is presented in good faith and not for delay; one 
copy of the certificate shall bear the manuscript signature 
of counsel or of the party when not represented by counsel. 
A petition for rehearing without such certificate shall be 
rejected by the Clerk. Such petition is not subject to oral 
argument. 
3. No response to a petition for rehearing will be received 
unless requested by the Court, but no petition will be 
granted without an opportunity to submit a response. 
4. Consecutive petitions for rehearings, and petitions for 
rehearing that are out of time under this Rule, will not be 
received. 185 
2. The Power to Grant Untimely Petitions 
For many years the Supreme Court has recognized that, except in 
Tax Court cases, the Court has power during a Court term to modifY 
any judgment rendered during that term, even upon an untimely 
petition for rehearing. This has been deemed a "general rule of the 
law" applicable to all courts. 186 All that is necessary, the untimely 
petition for rehearing being within the term, is that a motion for 
leave to file the petition should accompany it.187 
Under the Court's previous practice, the "term rule" covered cases 
in which untimely petitions for rehearing were filed within the term 
in which the adverse decision was rendered, in addition to cases 
carried over from one term to another after the summer recess-
185 [d. 
186RoBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 619 (6th ed. 1986) (citing Bronson 
v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410 (1881)). 
187 [d. 
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including subsequent untimely petitions filed III the following 
term. ISS 
The 1948 recodification of the Judicial Code, however, included 
a new provision, 28 U.S.C. Section 452. The second paragraph of 
this provision purported to eliminate the term rule for all federal 
courts: 
All courts of the United States shall be deemed always open 
for the purpose of filing proper papers, issuing and return-
ing process, and making motions and orders. 
The continued existence or expiration of a session of 
court in no way affects the power of the court to do any 
act or take any proceeding. ls9 
Facially, Section 452, as amended, can be interpretedas expanding 
indefinitely the Court's power to reopen a case, whether or not a 
term or session has expired. 
In United States v. Ohio Power Co. and subsequent decisions, how-
ever, the Court has effectively abandoned the term rule sub silentio, 
referring neither to the rule nor to Section 452 in its original or 
amended form.19o That same term, the Court denied certiorari as 
well as a timely petition for rehearing and a motion for leave to file 
a second and untimely petition for rehearing. l9l Late that term, the 
Court vacated its prior order denying the timely petition for rehear-
ing and "continued" that petition until the next term. 192 During the 
following term, the Court granted the "continued" petition for re-
hearing, vacated the denial of certiorari, and granted the petition 
for certiorari. The Court also summarily reversed the lower decision 
based on the Court's new rulings in two other cases.193 The four 
Justices of the majority discussed neither the term rule nor Section 
452, stating merely: 
We have consistently ruled that the interest in finality of 
litigation must yield where the interests of justice would 
make unfair the strict application of our rules. This policy 
finds expression in the manner in which we have exercised 
188ld. 
189ld. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 452 (l992)(as amended)). 
190 ld. (citing United States v. Ohio Power Co., 353 U.S. 98 (1957)). 
191 [d. (citing Ohio Power, 353 U.S. at 98). 
1921d. at 620. 
193 [d. 
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our power over our ownjudgments, both in civil and crimi-
nal cases.194 
This principle was later interpreted in Gondeck v. Pan American 
World Airways, in which a judgment was reversed in 1965 following 
the grant of a second and out-of-time petition for rehearing filed 
more than three years after the denial of certiorari in 1962 and the 
denial of a timely petition for rehearing. 195 In Gondeck, the Court 
stated "[ w ] e are now apprised, however, of 'intervening circum-
stances of substantial ... effect,' justifYing application of the estab-
lished doctrine that 'the interest in finality of litigation must yield 
where the interests of justice would make unfair the strict applica-
tion of our rules. "'196 The intervening circumstances in Gondeck 
consisted of both factual and legal developments. The Supreme 
Court resolved inconsistent appellate court rulings on the one 
hand.197 On the other hand, another plaintiff whose cause of action 
arose out of the same accident as Mrs. Gondeck's, subsequently won 
her case, making the comparison of the two outcomes seem inequi-
table.198 
Another means of obtaining a rehearing is a split in the case law 
between the Second and Ninth Circuits. The District Court gave 
cursory attention to Alvarez-Machain's third and fourth claims for 
relief. Under his third claim, Alvarez-Machain argued that the U.S. 
government violated the UN and OAS Charters when it authorized 
the DEA to forcibly abduct him from Mexican territory.199 Under his 
fourth claim, Alvarez-Machain urged the Court to use its supervisory 
power to dismiss the indictment. 200 Although the Court had already 
decided the case based on the Extradition Treaty, it noted an inter-
esting split in the case law between the Ninth and Second Circuit 
Courts of Appeal. 201 The principle that the UN and OAS Charters 
are not self-executing absent implementing legislation is accepted 
throughout the federal court system.202 The Second Circuit recog-
nizes, however, that the principles contained in those Charters rep-
194!d. (citing Ohio Power; 353 U.S. at 99). 
1951d. at 620-21 (citing Gondeck v. Pan American World Airways. 370 U.S. 918, reh'g denied 
371 U.S. 856 (1962), reh'g granted 382 U.S. 25 (1965)). 
1961d. (citing Gondeck, 382 U.S. at 26-27). 
1971d. 
[98 ld.(citing Pan American World Airways v. O'Hearne, 335 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1964). 
199 United States v. Car<rQuintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
200ld. 
2011d. at 615 n.25. 
2021d. at 614 n.24. 
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resent codified customary international law conveying individual 
rights to defendants.203 The Court noted that the Ninth Circuit does 
not recognize that these Charters convey individual rights to defen-
dants.204 
If Alvarez-Machain raised these two claims again at the district 
court level, and urged the District Court to use its supervisory 
powers to vindicate his international law rights, the Court would be 
obliged to rule consistently with Ninth Circuit decisions. He would 
then be free, however, to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court, 
which would have to resolve the dispute between the Ninth and 
Second Circuits of whether principles of international law convey 
substantive rights or affirmative defenses upon litigants in U.S. 
courts. Based on the holding in The Paquete Habana,205 the Court 
may have to resolve this issue in the affirmative-that aliens are 
entitled to the protection of their international law rights in the 
courts of the United States. Following this line of argument, the 
Supreme Court may thereafter be obliged to rule consistently with 
the principles of in ternationallaw outlined previously in this article 
in favor of Alvarez-Machain's motion to be returned to Mexico to 
stand trial. 
By far the most frequen t reason for granting even a timely petition 
for rehearing after denial of certiorari is the intervention of the 
conflicting decision of another court of appeals or of the Supreme 
Court. This is also the situation in which out-of-time petitions for 
rehearing have been granted. Given the factual circumstances sur-
rounding the Alvarez-Machain case, one would have to argue that 
the "interests of justice" have been miscarried because several of 
Alvarez-Machain's co-defendants, Rafael Caro-Quintero for exam-
ple, were tried in Mexico. In order to obtain a rehearing, however, 
one Justice who participated in the majority must certifY the motion 
203 Id. at 615 n.25 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 n.9 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
204 Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248 n.l (9th Cir. 1990)). "International 
law principles, standing on their own, do not create substantive rights or affirmative defenses 
for litigants in United States courts." Id. This observation is dicta, as no violation of interna-
tionallaw had occurred in Davis; therefore, it could not have been part of the ratio decidendi. 
See Davis, 905 F.2d at 245-51. In Davis, the Ninth Circuit cited United States v. Thomas, 893 
F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1990), although the issue in that case regarded the extraterritorial 
application of a statute. Davis, 905 F.2d at 248 n.1. The Thomas court did consider whether 
such an application would violate principles of international law and found no violation. 843 
F.2d at 1066,1072 Thus, the leap from the Ninth Circuit's findings in Thomas to its statement 
in Davis is not well substantiated. 
205 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
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and petition. As all five Justices in the majority were solidly behind 
the Rehnquist opinion, the chances of certification appear slight. 
B. Legislation 
If the petition is denied, legislative action should be sought from 
Congress confirming the proper application of customary interna-
tionallaw to and status of all extradition treaties to which the United 
States is party, and not treaties merely confined to the express 
prohibition of "kidnapping." 
Congress has passed legislation with respect to extradition.206 Al-
though many extradition treaties are already in force without provi-
sions proscribing the prosecution of abducted defendants, Congress 
may pass a law requiring the Executive Branch to repatriate foreign 
nationals to their homeland if they have been forcibly abducted 
therefrom without the consent of their government. This would, in 
effect, achieve the result sought by Alvarez-Machain. Such a law, 
supplementing 18 U.S.C.A. sections 3181 through 3195 could read 
as follows: 
If any person is brought within the jurisdiction of the 
federal and state courts of the United States from a foreign 
country, by means of a United States federal or state spon-
sored, forcible abduction, to which such foreign country 
does not consent, then the Executive shall repatriate such 
person at his request or the request of the foreign coun-
try's government. The Executive shall not prosecute such 
person unless the foreign country from which the person 
was abducted subsequently consents to the prosecution. In 
the event of the existence of an extradition treaty, the 
provisions therein must be strictly observed with respect to 
rendition to the requesting country. 
In the alternative, Congress could curtail the federal district courts' 
jurisdiction over these cases, as these courts are created by Con-
gress.207 Congress could curtail either the subject matter jurisdiction 
conferred on these courts by statute, under 28 U.S.C.A. section 1331, 
or the in personam jurisdiction which these courts exercise over 
defendants pursuant to common law principles of jurisdiction. Such 
provisions could provide: 
206 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3181-195 (West 1985), 
207U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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The federal district courts of the United States shall not 
have 1) in personam jurisdiction over a foreign national 
allegedly having committed a crime in a foreign country 
who was forcibly apprehended and brought before a 
United States court, or 2) federal subject-matter jurisdic-
tion for crimes not committed within the territorial limits 
of the United States, provided however, that the foreign 
country does not render the person in accordance with an 
existing extradition treaty and the United States court 
would otherwise have federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 
C. Executive Action 
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The Executive Branch may adopt the policy outlined by the Har-
vard Research Center in its Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime by implementing it in all future treaties. 208 Such a 
provision, as outlined, would read as follows: 
In exercising jurisdiction under this extradition treaty, nei-
ther State shall prosecute or punish any person who has 
been brought within its territory or a place subject to its 
authority by recourse to measures in violation of interna-
tionallaw or international convention without first obtain-
ing the consent of the State or States whose rights have 
been violated by such measures. 
As the renegotiation of extradition treaties does not occur fre-
quently, the Executive Branch could put this in practice using its 
discretionary authority. The Executive may choose not to prosecute 
foreign nationals who have been forcibly abducted by government 
agents. The Executive may choose to repatriate these individuals. 
Countries in the process of renegotiating their extradition treaties 
with the United States could insist on this provision. The implemen-
tation of such a policy would fill the gap between the extradition 
treaties and the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.209 
208 See Draft Cillwention, supra note 104. 
209 Two months after the Extradition Treaty entered into force, the Justice Department's 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion entitled "Extraterritorial Apprehension by 
the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation." 4B Op. Off. Leg. Counsel 543 (March 31, 1980). That 
opinion concluded that the FBI only has lawful authority to engage in extraterritorial appre-
hension when the asylum state acquiesces to the proposed operation. In June, 1989, however, 
the OLC issued a secret opinion partially reversing the 1980 opinion. See Statement of William 
Barr, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel on the Legality As a Matter of 
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D. Advisory opinion of the International Court of justice 
All members of the United Nations are members of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague, pursuant to 
Article 93 of the Charter.210 Both the United States and Mexico are 
members of the United Nations; therefore, Mexico could place its 
grievance before the ICJ for judicial resolution, pursuant to Article 
35 of the Statute of the IC].211 Such cases are termed "contentious" 
because they involve an actual dispute pending between two states. 
In light of the diplomatic circumstances surrounding the Alvarez-
Machain affair, the Mexican government may not wish to confront 
the United States in such a manner. There exist alternative means 
to place the issue before the IC]. 
Article 96 of the U.N. Charter212 also authorizes the ICJ to render 
advisory opinions with respect to any legal question.213 The General 
Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities That Depart From International Law, 
Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the judiciary, 
United States House of Representatives at 8 (Nov. 8, 1989). Assistant Attorney General Barr 
contended that the President, or an Executive agency such as the FBI, could override custom-
ary international law. Id. Subsequent to Mr. Barr's statement, the Legal Adviser of the U.S. 
Department of State, Abraham D. Sofaer, testified before Congress, and assured that body 
that the policy of the United States with regard to extraterritorial apprehensions had not 
changed since the 1980 opinion which outlined the practice of international cooperation 
among law enforcement agencies: 
It is the seriousness of these various policy implications, and our general respect 
for international law, that has led each witness today to emphasize that no change 
has been made in United States policy concerning extraterritorial arrests. Our policy 
remains to cooperate with foreign States in achieving law enforcement objectives. 
Statement of Abraham D. Sofaer; The Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State on The 
International Law and Foreign Policy Implications of Nonconsensual Extraterritorial Law Enforce-
ment Activities before the SubcommiUee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the 
judiciary, United States House of Representatives at 16--17 (Nov. 8, 1989). 
When treaties are concerned, however, it is generally agreed that the President does not 
have the authority to reinterpret or rewrite the terms contained therein without the advice 
and consent of the Senate. See Leigh, supra note 1, at 759. Even if the President did have the 
constitutional authority to act contrary to international law, it may be argued that such action 
lies within his sole discretion and may not be delegated to an Executive agency such as the 
FBI or the DEA. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other 
grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (lOth Cir. 1981). It is a power which only the President may exercise. 
In the aftermath of the Alvarez-Machain affair, the policy of the U.S. government respecting 
international law needs to be reaffirmed. 
210 U.N. CHARTER art. 93, 'lll. 
211 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1978 I.C]. Acts & Docs. No.4, at 75 
212U.N. CHARTER art. 96, 'll 1. 
213Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1978 I.C]. Acts & Docs. No.4, at 85-87 
Articles 65-68 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice govern advisory opinion 
procedure. Id. 
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Assembly or the Security Council must request these opinions. Arti-
cle 102(2) of the Rules of the ICJ provide that the ICJ must first 
determine if the legal question is pending between two states.214 This 
preliminary inquiry is procedural in nature. It is not necessary, 
however, that the two states involved give their consent to the advi-
sory opinion.215 If found to be the case, both states may be entitled 
to be heard before the Court, entitled to representation on the 
Court, or to appoint a judge ad hoc, pursuant to Article 102(3) of 
the Rules.216 
Although doubt exists as to whether the International Court of 
Justice is competent to render advisory opinions regarding disputes 
pending between two states when the dispute requires the resolution 
of questions of fact,217 there would appear to be no such dispute in 
the Alvarez-Machain case. First, there are no contended facts. Sec-
ond, neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit heard the 
issue of customary international law. Third, the District Court de-
cided the case on the grounds of the Extradition Treaty issue alone. 
Fourth, the United States has not responded to Mexico's diplomatic 
notes. No dispute which would deprive the ICJ of competence is 
present. 
Despite its diplomatic overtures, Mexico may bring international 
pressure to bear on the United States without taking a confronta-
tional position by sponsoring a resolution at the U.N. General As-
sembly calling for an advisory opinion by the ICJ. The issue to be 
submitted to the ICJ should read as follows: 
Whether the forcible abduction of one State's national 
from that State's territory by the government agents of 
another State, without the consent or acquiescence of the 
first State, when an extradition treaty between the two 
States, 1) exists and is in force, or 2) does not exist, violates 
customary international law or international treaty law. 
If the ICJ answers in the affirmative, its advisory opinion could 
motivate global opinion and bring international pressure to bear on 
the United States to recognize principles of customary international 
law or international treaty law and conform its conduct to such law. 
214 Rules of Court, 1978 I.C]. Acts & Docs. No.4, at 157. 
215 ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 716 (2d rev. ed. 1985). 
216 Rules of Court, 1978 I.C]. Acts & Docs. No.4, at 115,158. 
217 [d. at 157. 
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POST SCRIPT 
On November 17, 1992, nineteen Latin American countries, to-
gether with Spain and Portugal, requested that the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations submit an issue to the International Court 
of Justice for an Advisory Opinion as to whether the forcible abduc-
tion of one State's national and resident from that State's territory 
by the government agents of another State without the consent or 
acquiescence of the first State, violates customary international law 
when under circumstances identical to the Alvarez-Machain case. 
The request has been forwarded to the Sixth Committee (Legal 
Questions) which will undertake discussion of the matter in the 
General Assembly's Forty-Eighth Session taking place in 1993. 
On December 14, 1992 the District Court for the Central District 
of California, Judge Rafeedie presiding, issued an order acquitting 
Alvarez-Machain of all the charges against him and ordered his 
release, on the ground that the government had failed to make a 
prima facie case. 21S As a result of this order, Alvarez-Machain re-
turned to Mexico. The Supreme Court's opinion, however, remains 
on the books as possible precedent for future cases. Steps must 
therefore be taken in order to prevent forcible abductions of this 
nature from taking place in the future. 
2!8United States v. Alvarez-Machain, No. CR-87-422-(G)-ER (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1992). 
